This paper presents a theoretical model of rational retrospective voting, which is tested empirically on pooled cross-sectional and panel data from the Swedish Election Studies between 1985 and 1994 supplemented with time series on inflation and unemployment. Compared with the cross-sectional estimates, the panel estimates indicate a relatively greater impact of macroeconomic variables on the individual vote. The principal finding is, however, that microeconomic variables influence the vote about as much as macroeconomic variables do. In consequence, self-interest appears to be an important part of an adequate understanding of economic voting in Sweden. Regarding the determination of election outcomes, macroeconomic variables have been more influential.
Introduction
To what extent does self-interest explain vote choice? This much debated question has led researchers to examine the relative impact of macro-and microeconomic variables on the vote. If voters are primarily driven by self-interest and therefore support governments that advance their individual economic interests, microeconomic variables are expected to inßuence the vote. If voters are concerned with some conception of the public interest, one expects macroeconomic variables to inßuence the vote. However, since a prosperous economy is beneÞcial to everyone regardless of the concern for fellow citizens, responses to macroeconomic variables do not rule out self-interest. Consequently, it is only possible to test whether voters are altruists. If responses to microeconomic variables are considerable, this hypothesis can be rejected.
This paper develops a simple theoretical model of economic voting and tests it on
Swedish data. The model formalizes the discussion on economic voting by capturing implicit assumptions in the empirical literature. In particular, the model shows how individuals can use economic variables to infer how much they have to gain from the reelection of the incumbent government; in other words that retrospective voting is rational. 2 The model contains two motivations of retrospective voting. 3 The Þrst motivation originates from Downs (1957) , who argues that policies of political parties are stable over time. Because of this, retrospective voting helps to predict the policies that candidates from the incumbent government would implement if they 1 Since a wide deÞnition of self-interest makes this interpretation of economic voting very difficult to refute, it has been argued that only responses to microeconomic variables should be interpreted as signs of self-interest. See Lewin (1991) for an elaboration of this view.
2 With retrospective voting I mean voting based on results as opposed to prospective voting, which is based on intentions. Fiorina (1981, p. 8) notes that "The traditional theory of retrospective voting implicitly assumes that citizens are more concerned about actual outcomes than about the particular means of achieving those outcomes". 3 The model disregards electoral control as a motivation for retrospective voting. This view of elections as a disciplining device can be found in Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). were reelected. 4 The second motivation accentuates a factor omitted by Downs, the government's competence. In this manner, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) , Rogoff and Sibert (1988) , Rogoff (1990) , and Persson and Tabellini (1990) argue that certain economic variables are noisy signals of the government's competence. If competence is persistent, it is rational to support the incumbent government when macroeconomic outcomes are better than expected. In such situations, there is a good chance that the competence of the government is high. However, the citizens in these models are assumed to be identical-an obvious drawback if one wants to explain voting on the individual level.
The model contains both of these explanations of retrospective voting and also allows for heterogeneity among the citizens. In particular I assume that the incumbent government redistributes income among the citizens in a way that is persistent through time. In combination with the information assumptions of the model, this implies that the income of each citizen will affect his vote.
The vast empirical literature on economic voting started with the contributions of Kramer (1971) , Mueller (1970) , and Goodhart and Bhansali (1970) . After this breakthrough in the early 1970s, numerous aggregate studies have followed. Nannestad and Paldam (1994) call attention to four robust results: (1) people hold the government responsible for economic conditions, (2) in most cases, unemployment and inßation generate the most signiÞcant coefficients, (3) the voters' expectations are retrospective with a short time horizon, and (4) to rule costs popularity. However, aggregate studies only conÞrm that economics inßuences elections and do not distinguish between macro-and microeconomic conditions. 5 4 Alesina and Spear (1988) explain the consistency of a party's policies with a transfer scheme that is contingent on the incumbent's good behavior in an overlapping generations model. Harrington (1992) assumes that a lame duck incumbent prefers a successor from his own party and therefore refrain from implementing his own ideology since this reinforces the reputation of future candidates from his party. 5 Since this paper investigates economic voting in Sweden, the evidence from this country is also worth mentioning. In addition to the early contributions of Åkerman (1946, 1947) , at least four aggregate studies have been made on Swedish data. Frey (1979) reports that the rate of inßation and the rate of unemployment had a signiÞcant and negative impact on government popularity in The Þrst investigation of the relative impact of macro-and microeconomic variables on the vote was made by Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) . They found that US voters responded almost exclusively to macroeconomic variables. Kinder and Kiewiet used survey data and their results have been corroborated in numerous similar studies. Most notably by Lewis-Beck (1988) in a comprehensive investigation of economic voting in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United States.
The only Swedish study based on survey data is Holmberg (1984) . His conclusion is that economic factors were of some importance in the Swedish election of 1982.
However, short-run changes in the perceived Þnancial situation of the citizens offered only a minor explanation of their votes. Lewin (1991) reviews the aggregate and cross-sectional studies and concludes that the Þndings of relatively modest effects of microeconomic variables make the hypothesis of self-interest untenable. Another review, with a more cautious interpretation, is Nannestad and Paldam (1994) .
A drawback with cross-sectional survey data is that macroeconomic variables are by deÞnition constant across individuals. In view of this, researchers have chosen to work with perceptions of these variables. While it is true that perceptions-even if they are incorrect-matter in forming opinions, the link from changes in economic variables to changes in perceptions is clearly missing in these studies. If one wants to know how economic variables affect voting, it makes good sense to pool data from several elections. The pooling of cross-sections enables the incorporation of economic time series into the data set and estimation of the model using objective instead of subjective economic variables. the post-war years, whereas the growth of real income had a signiÞcant and positive impact in the same period. Considering the vote share of the incumbent government, only changes in the rate of unemployment had a signiÞcant (and negative) effect when all variables were simultaneously included in the model. Jonung and Wadensjö (1979) Þnd that inßation and unemployment exerted a strong and negative inßuence on the support for the ruling Social Democratic Party during the period [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] . In a similar study of nearly the same time period (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) , Hibbs and Madsen (1981) Þnd that the bloc of governing parties loses (gains) support when there are unexpected increases (decreases) in unemployment or inßation and gain (loses) support when there are unexpected increases (decreases) in disposable income growth relative to market income growth. This is in line with the Þndings in Madsen (1980) -that changes in the rate of unemployment, as opposed to the level of unemployment, had a negative and signiÞcant effect on the deviation from normal vote of the incumbent parties in the period 1920-1973. Up to the present, the Þndings from studies based on pooled cross-sectional data do not tally with the Þndings from purely cross-sectional studies. Both Markus (1988 , who uses data from the American National Election Studies between 1956 , and Nannestad and Paldam (1997a who investigate data from 28
Danish quarterly surveys between 1986 and 1992, Þnd that voters respond at least as much to micro-as to macroeconomic variables. 6 One explanation of this difference is that estimates based on survey responses may suffer from a simultaneity bias. In particular, an individual's perception of the macroeconomy might be affected by his vote choice. Strong supporters of the incumbent government might be inclined to adopt a relatively more favorable view of the state of the economy.
In this paper, I follow this most recent line of empirical research and estimate the model on pooled data from the Swedish Election Studies of 1985 Studies of , 1988 Studies of , 1991 Studies of , and 1994 supplemented with time series on unemployment and inßation. Unlike the previous empirical studies, I present estimates based on panel data in addition to the estimates based on pooled cross sections. The most notable difference between the speciÞcations with these different kinds of data is that the impact of macroeconomic variables on the vote is greater in the speciÞcations with panel data than in the crosssectional speciÞcations. The results also indicate that Swedish citizens respond about as much to micro-as to macroeconomic variables when deciding how to vote.
In particular, the experience of unemployment has a strong impact on the vote.
Compared to a citizen who is employed, an unemployed citizen is much more likely to vote for a left-wing and against a right-wing incumbent government.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model. In section 3 the model is estimated. Section 4 offers conclusions.
6 Nannestad and Paldam (1997a, p 120) are more controversial and claim that "Danes are mainly pocketbook voters".
A Model of Rational Retrospective Voting
The following model explains economic voting by each citizen's self-interest alone.
I assume that there are only two choices in an election: one left-and one right-wing alternative, one of which constitutes the incumbent government. The model focuses on the (incomplete) information of the citizens and in order to simplify the analysis, I do not explicitly model the behavior of the government. Instead, the government's competence and redistributive proÞle directly inßuence economic variables.
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Both real disposable income, w i,t , and the identity of the government matter for citizens. This is captured by the following indirect utility function of a citizen:
where subindex i denotes a citizen, subindex t a time period, g ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator variable which equals one if the government in the last period was reelected and A, the attitude towards the incumbent government, is citizen i's evaluation of this alternative on matters such as ideology, personality, and noneconomic policy issues. The citizens are rational and forward looking; each of them compares the expected utility of reelecting the incumbent government with the expected utility of electing the opposition. 8 Thus citizen i votes for the incumbent government if
where E t denotes expectations conditional on what the citizen knows in period t.
Each citizen is assumed to use historical data to forecast his income in the next time 7 Obviously, such a model does not allow the government to signal its competence by policy choices.
8 Since the citizens have only two alternatives to choose between and cannot inßuence the policy of the elected government, it is optimal to vote sincerely. The paper does not deal with "the paradox of voting" (see e.g. Downs, 1957 or Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) . To evade the paradox, one could assume either that all citizens vote or that the model only describes the behavior of the citizens who make it to the polls. period conditional on the identity of the elected government.
9 Since income depends on both the competence and the redistributive proÞle of the government, the vote will be inßuenced by forecasts of these characteristics of the government and the opposition. Although the government's competence and redistributive proÞle are not observed directly, certain economic variables provide signals of these characteristics. However, one difference between the two political alternatives is assumed to be known by the citizens-that social insurance is more generous under a left-wing government. This distinction between the degree of certainty of different political characteristics is thought to reßect the fact that some policies (e.g. transfers) have a direct (and thus more certain) impact on personal income, whereas other polices (e.g. economic policies in general) have a more indirect (and thus more uncertain) impact on personal income.
Following some of the literature on electoral cycles referred to in the introduction (especially Persson and Tabellini, 1990) , I assume that the competence of the government inßuences economic variables. Moreover, competence is assumed to be persistent. To be precise, it is assumed to be a moving average given by
where µ t is a random shock with mean zero and variance σ 2 µ . 10 The assumption that competence is persistent is crucial but hardly unreasonable. The citizens observe κ t with a one-period delay. Differences in competence between government and opposition reßect their different abilities to solve current economic problems.
Competence is assumed to be a random variable since the nature of the economic 9 The model is unrealistic in the sense that voters are often found to have a very vague knowledge about the state of the economy. The model may however be defended by referring to Sanders (2000) , who argues that (British) voters are quite aware of the general macroeconomic situation and that their knowledge matters electorally. 10 Fair (1978) Þnds that the economic performance of previous presidents from the opposition party does not inßuence the voters in US presidential elections.
problems changes over time.
Regarding macroeconomic variables, inßation and unemployment are the most obvious candidates to be included in the model since they are typically found to have the most signiÞcant effects (Paldam, 1997) and are almost always included in vote and popularity functions. Besides, unemployment is particularly suitable for this study due to its existence on the macro-as well as on the microeconomic level.
SpeciÞcally, I assume that changes in the rate of inßation, ∆π, and unemployment, ∆U , depend on the competence of the government. Since a new government "inherits" rates of inßation and unemployment, this seems to be a more reasonable approximation than to let the levels of these variables be inßuenced by the government's competence.
11 Thus, changes in inßation and unemployment are given by ∆π t = −κ t + δ t (2.4) and
5) where δ t and γ t are unobserved random variables with mean zero and variance σ 2 δ and σ 2 γ . Furthermore, the relative change in the real income of each citizen, ∆w i,t , is supposed to be given by the following expression:
where u i,t is an indicator variable which equals one if citizen i is unemployed in time period t and equals zero otherwise, ρ i,t ∼ ¡ 0,σ and α g,t < 0 is the impact of unemployment on the relative change in real income.
Both α g,t and the analogous characteristic of the opposition, α o,t , are assumed to be known by all citizens. Finally, θ i,t is the net effect of redistribution to citizen i excluding unemployment insurance. Contrary to α g,t and α o,t , θ i,t is unknown to the citizen since it captures the effect of policies that have a more indirect impact on the citizen's income. This variable has the same dynamic structure as competence:
where ν i,t is a random variable with mean zero and variance σ 2 ν . Each citizen observes ν i,t with a delay of one period. All random variables are assumed to be independent.
In order to compare the government with the opposition, the citizens have to estimate the variables κ t and θ i,t on the basis of knowing only ∆π t , ∆U t , ∆w i,t and u i,t α g as well as the means, second moments and cross second moments of the random variables. Starting with κ t , the citizens observe three signals of this random variable. Using linear least square projection (described in Appendix A), the best estimate of κ t iŝ
(2.9) Equation (2.9) tells us that the estimate of θ i,t is increasing in ∆π t and ∆U t since rising inßation and unemployment decreases the estimate of κ t , making it more likely that a higher wage is due to redistribution. The ratio of these weights is the same as in (2.8). Moreover, the weight on ∆w i,t − u i,t α g,t is greater than the weights on ∆π t and ∆U t since ∆w i,t depends on both κ t and θ i,t.
By substituting the estimatesκ t+1 (2.8) andθ i,t+1 (2.9) into (2.2), one gets a more speciÞc condition for supporting the government:
(2.10)
This condition states that a citizen is more likely to support an incumbent government if his attitude towards it is more positive than his attitude towards the opposition (A i > 0). He is also more likely to support the government if the rate of inßation or unemployment has decreased or if his own income has increased. Regarding unemployment on the personal level there are two effects at work. First, experience of unemployment increases the support for a left-wing incumbent government, since in this case α g,t − α o,t > 0 and we assume Pr [
. Second, the experience of unemployment (u i,t = 1) increases the estimates of competence,κ t+1 , and net redistribution,θ i,t+1 , for a given change in real income (since α g,t < 0). The interaction of the two effects is such that the left hand side of (2.10) is greater for u i,t = 1 than for u i,t = 0 if there is a left-wing government. With a right-wing government it is ambiguous whether the expression is greater for u i,t = 1 or u i,t = 0. It is more likely to be greater for
The model can be estimated as a model for binary choice if a disturbance term is added to (2.10). This estimation is done in the next section. Equation (2.10) also formally conÞrms that even if citizens are motivated by self-interest, macroeconomic variables can indeed be expected to inßuence their votes. Regarding the relative impact of changes in the macroeconomic variables, we expect the variance of the changes in inßation and unemployment to be the determining factor. From (2.4) and (2.5), we see that the variable with the greater variance contains less information on competence. In consequence, the model predicts that a citizen in the voting booth reacts less to a given change in this variable.
Empirical Investigation

Data
The data set 13 contains information on individuals from the four most recent Swedish Election Studies (1985, 1988, 1991 and 1994) Although Sweden has a multi-party system, I follow the common practice 15 of treating it as a two-bloc system. 16 For the period of study, this does not seem to violate the actual situation in the Swedish Parliament very much. The dependent variable in all estimations is choice of political bloc. Votes for one of the parties in the bloc with a majority in parliament are coded one and votes for other parties are 13 The major part of the data in this paper has been made available by the Swedish Social Science Data Service (SSD). The data in the Swedish Election Studies was originally collected in a research project at the Department of Political Science at Göteborg University, under the guidance of Sören Holmberg and Mikael Gilljam. Neither SSD nor the primary researchers are responsible for the analyses presented in this paper.
14 In one case I also use data from the election study of 1982 in order to compute the variable ∆w i,t .
15 See e.g. Alesina et al. (1997) , Laver and SchoÞeld (1990) , Johansson (1999) and Pettersson Lidbom (2000) . 16 The left-wing bloc includes the Social Democratic Party, the Leftist Party and the Green Party. The right-wing bloc includes the Conservative Party, the Centrist Party, the Liberal Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the New Democratic Party. coded zero. The independent variables ∆U t , ∆π t , ∆w i,t , Lef t, Right are objective, whereas the other independent variables, P (Macro), P (Micro) , and u i,t , are subjective (P indicates the perception of the variable). As in the related literature, the control variable for political preferences or attitudes, Attitude, is constructed from sociodemographic characteristics. A description of all the variables is given in Appendix B. The first specification includes two objective macroeconomic variables, changes in the rates of unemployment and inßation (∆U t and ∆π t ) together with a subjective microeconomic measure of the self-reported change in the Þnancial situation of the citizen's houshold. This variable, P (Micro), is trichotomous: "worse" is coded -1, "about the same" is coded 0, and "better" is coded 1. Thus, the Þrst speciÞcation of the model is: In the second specification I switch to using an objective measure of ∆w i,t , the percentage change in real income net of taxes since the previous election. Unfortunately, the data on income are not as exact in the election study of 1988 as it is in the other studies. Therefore estimation with ∆w i,t as one of the independent variables is restricted to the elections of 1985 and 1994. Because of this, I use a subjective measure of changes in macroeconomic conditions instead of ∆U t and ∆π t in this speciÞcation. This subjective variable P (Macro) is trichotomous with the same coding as the analogous variable P (Micro). Thus, the second speciÞcation is:
The third specification contains both of the mentioned subjective measures and is written as follows:
The theoretical model predicts b 1 and b 2 in the Þrst speciÞcation to be negative and b 1 in the other two speciÞcations to be positive. In all speciÞcations, c 1 and c 2 are predicted to be positive. Regarding a and c 3 , the predicted signs are ambiguous, but, for reasons explained in the previous section, we expect c 3 < c 2 . Table 1 displays the estimation results. Column 1 contains the estimates from the Þrst, column 2 from the second, and column 3 from the third speciÞcation.
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For all speciÞcations, the signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. In the Þrst and in the third speciÞcation all coefficients are also statistically signiÞcant at the Þve percent level (except for Right * u i,t whose sign was expected to be ambiguous). For the second speciÞcation the picture is less clear; neither the coefficient for ∆w i,t nor the one for Lef t * u i,t is signiÞcantly different from zero. However, the small and insigniÞcant coefficient for ∆w i,t may well be due to a shortcoming in the income measure. The election studies contain the respondents' income in the year before the election, which is unfortunate since the empirical evidence suggests that the effect of changing economic conditions is of a short duration (see e.g. Paldam, 1997) . 17 Allowing observations from the same year to be dependent (but still assuming independence across years) does not change the levels of statistical signiÞcance in Table 1 in any important way. It is also worth noting that c 3 , the coefficient for Right * u i,t , in all cases turned out to be smaller than c 2 just as the model predicted. Moreover, in none of the speciÞcations it is possible to reject the hypothesis c 2 = −c 3 by a Wald test.
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This may be interpreted as an indication that the experience of unemployment only inßuences the vote through differences in expected provision of insurance against unemployment and not through estimates of competence and net redistribution.
Within the framework of the model, this means that the only effect of unemployment appears to work through the term Pr[u i,t+1 ] (α g,t − α o,t ) in equation (2.10).
Because of the more generous social insurance under a left-wing government, this term switches sign (from positive to negative) when such a government is replaced by a right-wing government and vice versa.
Finally we note that the coefficient for ∆U t is considerably larger than the coefficient for ∆π t (in absolute values). Since the variance of ∆U t is only a fraction reveal that the potential impact on the predicted probabilities are greater for subjective economic variables (P (Macro) and P (Micro)) than for objective economic variables (∆U t , ∆π t and ∆w i,t ). This is especially evident for the impact of changes in the microeconomic situation (P (Micro) and ∆w i,t ), which is substantial in Table   2 and 4 but minute in Table 3 . Each row of the table shows how the probability to vote for the government changes when certain variables are varied and the others are held constant.
The Þrst row, for example, shows that this probability is .405 when ∆U t is at its maximum and .515 when it is at its minimum. Probabilities are based on column 1 in Table 1 . In each case, the other variables are assigned the following values: ∆U t = 1.5 (mean), ∆π t = −2.101 (mean), P (Micro) = 0 (midpoint), Left × u i,t = 0, Right × u i,t = 0, Attitude = .505 (mean). Standard errors (calculated with the "delta method") are in parentheses.
* midpoint in the case of P (Micro). Each row of the table shows how the probability to vote for the government changes when certain variables are varied and the others are held constant.
The Þrst row, for example, shows that this probability is .751 when P (Macro)
is at its maximum. Probabilities are based on column 2 in Table 1 . In each case, the other variables are assigned the following values: P (Macro) = 0 (midpoint), ∆w i,t = 0, Lef t × u i,t = 0, Right × u i,t = 0, Attitude = .505 (mean). Standard errors (calculated with the "delta method") are in parentheses. Each row of the table shows how the probability to vote for the government changes when certain variables are varied and the others are held constant.
The Þrst row, for example, shows that this probability is .657 when P (Macro)
is at its maximum. Probabilities are based on column 3 in Table 1 . In each case, the other variables are assigned the following values: P (Macro) = 0 (midpoint), P (Micro) = 0 (midpoint), Lef t × u i,t = 0, Right × u i,t = 0, Attitude = .505 (mean). Standard errors (calculated with the "delta method") are in parentheses.
Even though the estimates are sensitive to the empirical speciÞcation of the model, the estimates clearly suggests that both macro-and microeconomic variables inßuence voting behavior substantially. In particular, it is not possible to claim that the impact of microeconomic variables on the vote is negligible. Obviously it is difficult to compare the effects of the macro-and the microeconomic variables on the vote. One has to accept a certain amount of arbitrariness in order to make the quantitative and qualitative variables comparable. In order to make such a comparison, Table 2 contains predicted probabilities for values of ∆U t and ∆π t that are one standard deviation above and below the means of these variables. Comparing a "standard change", where one of these variables increases from its mean to a value of one standard deviation above its mean, with a one unit change in the microeconomic variables P (Micro) and Lef t × u i,t , the effects of the microeconomic variables appear to be greater in this speciÞcation. In the second speciÞcation, the effect of the macroeconomic variable P (Macro) appears to be greater than the effects of microeconomic variables (Table 3) , but the mentioned drawbacks to the variable ∆w i,t makes this comparison less interesting. In the third speciÞcation (Table 4) , it is true that the effect of P (Macro) is greater than the effect of P (Micro), but the largest effect is the one of Left × u i,t . Thus in the two most interesting of the three speciÞcations, changes in microeconomic variables affect the predicted probability to vote for the government more than "standard" changes in macroeconomic variables do.
Estimates Based on Panel Data
Since each respondent in the Swedish Election Studies is interviewed twice, it is possible to use panel data when estimating the model in order to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. I apply the random effects probit model. With panel data, the dependent variable V ote is recoded to indicate choice of bloc (left-wing=1) since it is reasonable to interpret the unobserved heterogeneity as the individual's political bias in favor of one of the blocs (I have chosen the left-wing bloc). Thus, it is no more necessary to include the control variable Attitude. In consequence of this change, the variables ∆U t , ∆π t , P (Macro) and P (Micro) are interacted with incumbency status (left-or right-wing) in order to enter the speciÞcations as predicted by the theoretical model. Using the whole unbalanced panel, estimates from three different speciÞcations are presented.
The first specification contains the objective macroeconomic variables ∆U t and ∆π t together with the subjective microeconomic variables P (Micro) and u i,t .
Thus, the Þrst speciÞcation using panel data is:
where I t is an indicator variable which equals one in 1985, 1988 and 1991 (when there were left-wing governments) and negative one in 1994 (when there was a right-wing government) and d i is the individual random effect.
As a sensitivity check, the second specification also contains the annual growth of real GDP, a variable which is often included in voting models:
(3.5)
The third specification contains subjective variables only and is written: Compared to the cross sectional estimates in Table 1 , the coefficients for the macroeconomic variables, ∆U t , ∆π t and P (Macro), are greater, whereas the impact of personal unemployment is a bit smaller.
As a small sensitivity analysis, I have estimated the Þrst and the third speciÞcation on a balanced panel and for two shorter time periods. When reducing the data set to a balanced panel with 3,706 observations, the only important difference compared with the estimates in Table 5 is that the coefficient for u i,t is marginally insigniÞcant at the 5 percent level in the Þrst speciÞcation. When excluding the Þrst step of the unbalanced panel (individuals observed in 1985 and 1988) , the same coefficient is not statistically signiÞcant at the Þve percent level.
When instead excluding the last step of the panel (individuals observed in 1991 and 1994), the coefficient for ∆π t is no longer statistically signiÞcant in the Þrst speciÞcation, whereas the coefficient for u i,t becomes statistically signiÞcant at the one percent level both in the Þrst and in the third speciÞcation. The estimates from this sensitivity analysis are found in Appendix C.
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Inspired by the "grievance asymmetry" found among Danish voters by Nannestad and Paldam (1997b) , I have also conducted tests for asymmetric effects of economic improvements and deteriorations. The tests only reveal such a pattern for the variable P(Micro) in the third speciÞcation, and never for the variable P(Macro). In the third speciÞcation, only deteriorations in the personal Þnancial situation were found to inßuence the vote. Random effects probit model. The dependent variable vote is coded 1 for leftwing and 0 for right-wing governments. The variables ∆U t , ∆π t , P (Macro), and P (Micro) are interacted with the identity of the incumbent government so that the coefficients represent the impact on the propensity to vote for the incumbent government. Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates signiÞcance at the 5% level. ** indicates signiÞcance at the 1% level. ρ is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component.
As was evident in the previous subsection, the estimated coefficients are easier to interpret if we compare predicted probabilities for different sets of values of the explanatory variables. Table 6 , 7, and 8 display such predicted probabilities which indicate the potential impact on the vote of certain changes in the variables of interest. The striking dissimilarity to the potential impacts in Table 2 and 4 is the considerable impact of changes in ∆U t (Table 6 ). The impact of P (Macro) is also greater than it was with cross sectional data, although this difference is less dramatic. Thus the application of panel data indicates a greater importance of macroeconomic variables than is the case with pooled cross sections. Each row of the table shows how the probability to vote for the left-wing bloc changes when certain variables are varied and the others are held constant.
The Þrst row, for example, shows that this probability is .199 when ∆U t is at its maximum. Probabilities are based on column 1 in Table 6 . In each case, the other variables are assigned the following values: ∆U i,t = 1.5 (mean), ∆π t = 2.101 (mean), P (Micro) = 0 (midpoint), u i,t = 0. Standard errors (calculated with the "delta method") are in parentheses.
* midpoint in the case of P (Micro). Each row of the table shows how the probability to vote for the left-wing bloc changes when certain variables are varied and the others are held constant.
The Þrst row, for example, shows that this probability is .669 when P (Macro)
is at its maximum. Probabilities are based on column 3 in Table 6 . In each case, the other variables are assigned the following values: P (Macro) = 0 (midpoint), P (Micro) = 0 (midpoint), u i,t = 0. Standard errors (calculated with the "delta method") are in parentheses.
We also want to make the same kind of comparisons between the effects of the macro-and microeconomic variables as was done with the cross-sectional speciÞca-tions. In the Þrst panel speciÞcation (Table 6 ), the effect on the vote of a "standard" decrease in ∆U t from its mean to one standard deviation below its mean is about as great as the effect of the dummy variable u i,t . At the same time, the effect of the same decrease in ∆π t is somewhat greater then the effect of a one unit increase in the other microeconomic variable P (Micro). Thus the effect of macroeconomic variables appears to be roughly as great as the effect of microeconomic variables in this speciÞcation. In the third panel speciÞcation on the other hand (Table 7) , the effect of the subjective macroeconomic variable P (Macro) is considerably greater than the effect of the subjective macroeconomic variable P (Micro). Thus the relative sizes of the macro-and the microeconomic effects depend on the chosen empirical speciÞcation. I am however inclined to put more weight on the speciÞcation with objective macroeconomic variables since it eliminates perception biases from these variables.
The Impact on Election Outcomes
So far, the analysis has focused on individual vote choice. In order to assess the capacity of different variables to affect election outcomes we need to consider the aggregate effect of changes in the explanatory variables. Due to the close connection between the variables ∆U t and u i,t , I have chosen to investigate whether unemployment inßuences election outcomes mainly because rising unemployment makes everybody believe that the government is less competent or mainly because the unemployed vote differently than the employed. In addition, the personal unemployment variable u i,t is more likely than P (Micro) to affect election outcomes, since many of the individual effects of the latter variable cancel out in the aggregate.
According to the model, the total effect of unemployment depends on the identity of the incumbent government. With a left-wing government, the negative macroeconomic effect of rising unemployment is mitigated by the positive effect of the increased support for the government among the unemployed. With a right-wing government on the other hand, the macro-and the microeconomic effect reinforce each other. Even if the experience of unemployment has about the same potential to inßuence on individual vote choice as changes in the rate of unemployment have, the latter variable affects every voter and may therefore be more important for election outcomes.
In Table 8 , the macro-and microeconomic effects of unemployment on election outcomes are compared by predicting the outcomes in the four elections under the counterfactual absence of one of these effects at a time. Obviously such a specula-tive exercise can only provide us with a very crude measure of actual and potential inßuences on election outcomes. Table 8 displays predicted vote shares in a hypothetical case when nobody is unemployed (u i,t = 0 ∀i) and in another hypothetical case when the rate of unemployment is constant (∆U t = 0) for estimates based on cross sectional and panel data. The cross sectional estimates have much smaller prediction errors (especially in 1991). This is due to the absence of the control variable
Attitude in the speciÞcations based on panel data. The differences between the conditional and unconditional vote shares suggest that the total macroeconomic effect of unemployment has been larger than the total microeconomic effect. However, the total microeconomic effect of unemployment is not negligible. An additional percentage point of the votes can very well be decisive in close races. The table is based on the estimates in column 1 in Table 1 and in Table 5 .
*among the parties that won seats in parliament
Concluding Remarks
The empirical results which are based on pooled cross-sections conÞrm the Þndings in Markus (1988 Markus ( , 1992 , and Nannestad and Paldam (1997a) that microeconomic variables inßuence voting decisions about as much as macroeconomic variables do.
Especially the experience of unemployment appears to have a considerable inßuence on the vote. The unemployed tend to support left-wing and oppose right-wing governments. This is roughly in accordance with Nannestad and Paldam (1995) , Thus, the Þndings in this paper strike a balance between the "pocketbook"
and the altruistic view of voting. In particular the results cast doubt on claims in previous studies that changes in individual Þnancial conditions have a minimal impact on the vote. In fact, even if responses to macroeconomic variables are assumed to be due to a concern for fellow citizens, which itself is far from clear, self-interest still can be about as important for individual vote choice as is such an altruistic concern.
Previously, the relative importance of self-interest as a vote motive has been found to differ substantially from one country to the next. Since this is the Þrst paper to investigate economic voting by applying panel data, there is an obvious need for similar research for other countries. Nevertheless, the fact that Swedes appear to be more pocketbook oriented than Americans have been found to be, can be interpreted by the culture hypothesis of Nannestad and Paldam (1997a) . According to this hypothesis, Swedes Þnd it more natural to hold the government responsible for economic changes when compared with the more individualistic Americans. Indeed, a distinguishing feature a welfare state is that the public sector actively tries to inßuence the welfare of the citizens.
Regarding the effects of unemployment on election outcomes, the macroeconomic effect of unemployment appear to have a much larger potential of inßuencing outcomes compared with the microeconomic effect. The total microeconomic effect of unemployment is, however, not negligible.
Appendix A Linear Projections
A citizen has to estimate κ t and θ i,t on the basis of knowing ∆π t , ∆U t and
. Since the citizen is supposed to know the means, second moments and cross second moments of these variables, he can solve the problem by using linear regression. In general, the linear least squares projection of a random variable
is found by minimizing
with respect to a 0 , a 1, ..., a n . The solution to this problem is given by the orthogonality principle (see e.g. Sargent, 1979) . This principle states a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a 0 , a 1 , ..., a n to minimize (A1), viz.
In our case of estimating κ, rearranging the orthogonality conditions in (A2) yields:
where w 0 = ∆w i,t − u i,t α g,t and subindices are omitted. Using the relations in (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7), these equations can be written
exists and equals
Thus, the projection of κ t on ∆π t , ∆U t , (∆w i,t − u i,t α g,t ) and a constant is
In the case of estimating θ i,t , we have
Using the relations in (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7), these equations can be
with the solution
Thus, the projection of θ i,t on ∆π t , ∆U t , (∆w i,t − u i,t α g,t ) and a constant is 
∆π
The difference between the annual inßation during the present and the last term of office.
∆GDP
The difference between the annual rate of real GDP growth during the present and the last term of office. 
P(Macro)
Perception of the change in the country's economy. The variable is based on answers to the following question: "According to your own opinion, how has the Swedish economy developed the last two or three years. Has it gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse?" Better is coded 1, about the same is coded 0 and worse is coded -1.
∆w
The relative change in personal income net of taxes between the year before the election of study and the year before the last election. If the income in either year equals zero, the value is assumed to be missing.
P(Micro)
Perception of the change in the own Þnancial situation. The variable is based on answers to the following question: "If you compare your Þnancial situation with how it was two or three years ago, has it gotten better, stayed about the same or has it gotten worse?" It is coded as P(Macro). 
Attitude
The structurally determined probability to support the incumbent government.
Computed as the predicted probability to vote for any of the parties in the governing coalition based on the following variables: education, church attendance, sector of employment (private or public), home ownership, occupation, and the home town's population. The following 1985-94 1985-94 1988-94 1988-94 1985-91 1985- Notes: see Table 5 .
